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ABSTRACT
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was created in 1925 to permit judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements covering commercial contract disputes
between parties with roughly equal bargaining power.  Today, however, the FAA is
the legal authority for judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements covering not
only contractual claims but also statutory claims, and not only of disputes between
commercial entities but also disputes involving parties with grossly disparate bar-
gaining power such as companies and employees/consumers.  Moreover, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA as strongly favoring arbitration, and the
Court has used preemption analysis to restrict the ability of states to regulate arbi-
tration agreements.  This has led many commentators to argue that the FAA is ill-
suited to its new use—that it is unfair to permit companies to foist arbitration agree-
ments on employees and consumers who have little understanding of what they are
signing, and in any event have no meaningful choice if they want the job or product
or service the company is offering.
In 1990, Congress faced a similar problem in a different context.  Congress was
amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) to prohibit employ-
ers from discriminating on the basis of age in the administration of employee benefit
plans.  Congress wished to give employees the ability to agree to early retirement
and to settle benefits claims, but was concerned that employers would coerce older
employees into accepting grossly unfair agreements that the employees did not
understand.  Congress responded by passing the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act (“OWBPA”).  The OWBPA presumes that a waiver of ADEA rights is not know-
ing and voluntary (and therefore is unenforceable) unless certain procedural
requirements are met.  For example, the waiver must be written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by an average employee, the employer must advise the
employee in writing to consult with an attorney prior to signing the agreement, and
* J.D., Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.  Special thanks to
my parents for their dedicated support and encouragement.
† Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
Special thanks to Roger Billings, Seth Harris, the faculties of the University of South
Carolina College of Law and Wayne State University Law School, Jean Sternlight and other
participants in the “Rethinking the Federal Arbitration Act” Symposium, and the editors and
staff members of the Nevada Law Journal for helpful comments and suggestions.  A small
part of this Article was adapted from Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in
Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 418-420 (2006).
10
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ102.txt unknown Seq: 2 16-JAN-08 13:33
Fall 2007] EXTENDING OWBPA PROTECTIONS 11
the employer must give the employee at least twenty-one days within which to con-
sider the agreement.
This Article argues that Congress should amend the FAA to add suitably-modi-
fied OWBPA-like notice requirements to arbitration agreements directed at most
employees and consumers.  This approach will help ensure that employees and con-
sumers understand what it is they are signing, and thereby may encourage some
companies to draft arbitration agreements that are substantively more balanced.
This approach is not, however, a panacea that will cure all the ills of arbitration, but
instead is designed as a politically feasible, incremental improvement on employment
and consumer arbitration.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[Our] liberties . . . cannot but subsist so long as this palladium remains sacred and
inviolate, not only from all open attacks, (which none will be so hardy as to make)
but also from all secret machinations, which may sap and undermine it.1
The Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial is one of the most treasured
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.  William Blackstone
remarked that trial by jury is “a privilege of the highest and most beneficial
nature.”2  This fundamental right was so valued and protected by the founders
of the United States that a person would have found it difficult to waive during
the nineteenth century, and enforcement of such a waiver was extremely rare.3
However, within the past century, agreements to arbitrate (containing, at
least implicitly, a jury trial waiver) became not only enforceable but part of the
normal course of business in both private and commercial arenas.  In 1925,
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) to permit judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements covering commercial contract disputes
between parties with roughly equal bargaining power.4  Since then, the
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *343.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *349-50.
3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 4.1.2, at 4:4 (1994).
4 Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act:  An
Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 296 (1996); Stephen
J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Con-
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Supreme Court has been very deferential toward parties contracting for arbitra-
tion, stressing that because arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion, . . .
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see
fit.”5  At the same time, the Court has forbidden the states from regulating the
formation of arbitration agreements, holding that the FAA preempts any state
law targeted specifically at arbitration agreements even if the purpose of the
law is to promote the knowing choice of arbitration.6
Today, the FAA is the legal authority for judicial enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements covering not only contractual claims but also statutory claims,
and not only of disputes between commercial entities but also disputes involv-
ing parties with little or no bargaining power,7 such as employees and consum-
ers.  Many commentators have argued that the FAA is ill-suited to its new use.
These commentators have argued, for example, that it is unfair and inconsistent
with the federal and state guarantees of a right to trial by jury to permit compa-
nies to foist arbitration agreements on employees and consumers who have lit-
tle understanding of what they are signing, and in any event have no
meaningful choice if they want the job or product or service the company is
offering.8
Arguments against employment and consumer arbitration generally come
in one of two forms.  The first is that there is a failure in the process by which
the agreements are formed—e.g., many employees and consumers do not
understand what they are signing, or they lack a meaningful choice as to
whether to accept such an agreement.  The second type of argument criticizes
the substantive terms of employment and consumer arbitration agreements—
e.g., many agreements impose onerous arbitration fees on employees and con-
sumers, or restrict awardable damages.  This Article focuses on the first type of
stitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 176-80 (2004).  The statute originally
was proposed by the American Bar Association’s Committee on Commerce, Trade, and
Commercial Law. Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:  Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 21 (1924).  In response to an
objection that the bill would be used to compel arbitration of labor disputes, the Chair of the
Committee stated that the intent of the statute was “to give the merchants the right or the
privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they
want to do it.” Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Fed-
eral Arbitration:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong.
9 (1923).
5 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479
(1989).
6 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 & n.3, 688 (1996).
7 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion Under the
Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999) (arguing that privatization of law
through arbitration is bad, particularly when the parties occupy vastly different positions of
bargaining power).
8 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the
Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17 (2003) [hereinafter Sternlight, The Rise and Spread]; Jean
R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001) [hereinafter Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration].
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argument, and more particularly on the argument that arbitration agreements
often suffer from a lack of adequate notice and consent.9
In 1990, Congress faced a similar problem in a different context.  Con-
gress was amending the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) to
prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of age in their administra-
tion of employee benefit plans.  Congress wished to give employees the ability
to agree to early retirement and to settle benefits claims, but was concerned that
employers would coerce older employees into accepting grossly unfair agree-
ments that the employees did not understand.  Congress responded by passing
the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA” ).10  The OWBPA
presumes that a waiver of ADEA rights is not knowing and voluntary (and
therefore is unenforceable) unless certain procedural requirements are met.  For
example, the waiver must be written in a manner calculated to be understood by
an average employee, the employer must advise the employee in writing to
consult with an attorney prior to signing the agreement, and the employer must
give the employee at least twenty-one days within which to consider the
agreement.
This Article argues that Congress should amend the FAA to add suitably-
modified OWBPA-like notice requirements to arbitration agreements directed
at most employees and consumers.  This approach will help ensure that
employees and consumers understand what it is they are signing, and thereby
may encourage some companies to draft arbitration agreements that are sub-
stantively more balanced.  This approach is not, however, a panacea that will
cure all the ills of arbitration.  It does not, for example, directly address the
many substantive terms of an arbitration agreement that can be drafted to over-
whelmingly favor the company.11  Instead, it is designed to be a politically
feasible, incremental improvement on employment and consumer arbitration as
it exists today.
Part II of this Article explains the Supreme Court’s journey from near total
rejection of mandatory arbitration agreements to its strong preference for
enforcing such agreements.  Part III explains the various notice and consent
standards currently used by courts in evaluating the enforceability of employ-
ment and consumer arbitration agreements.  First, analysis of the “knowing and
voluntary” standard will set the framework for understanding how courts began
to approach notice of arbitration agreements.  Second, the Ninth Circuit’s use
of the “where appropriate” standard will provide an example of the minority
approach to arbitration agreements.  Third, an examination of the majority
approach of applying state contract law to arbitration agreements will show
how courts enforce arbitration agreements just as they do other standard-form
adhesive contracts.  Finally, the application of a civil jury trial waiver to such
agreements will show how some courts have viewed arbitration agreements as
9 For a detailed description of notice and consent issues in employment arbitration, see
Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J.
415, 435-50 (2006).
10 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
11 See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market and the Need for a
Uniform Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN.
L. REV. 583, 606-08 (2004).
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a waiver of a person’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and have
attempted to raise the standard for enforcement.
Part IV examines the OWBPA standard and how it could be modified and
applied to employment and consumer arbitration.12  The OWBPA’s heightened
notice standard protects workers close to retirement from waiving prospective
claims against an employer without knowing and voluntary consent to the
waiver provision.  This higher notice standard has not dampened enthusiasm
for age discrimination waiver clauses—it has simply ensured that employees
who sign such clauses have a reasonable opportunity to understand what it is
they are signing.  This Article argues that a similar effect can be obtained for
employment and consumer arbitration agreements.  Moreover, such a standard
would benefit employees, consumers, and companies by providing a much
clearer and more consistent standard for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by discussing the trend of judicial acceptance of arbitra-
tion agreements.  Second, this Part will examine the common law jury trial
waiver and its roots in the Seventh Amendment.  Finally, this Part will contrast
the jury trial waiver with the modern trend of arbitral contractualism.
A. The FAA and Supreme Court Cases
Historically, common law courts were hostile to arbitration agreements.13
In 1925, Congress responded by enacting the Federal Arbitration Act, which
required courts to enforce arbitration agreements related to commerce and mar-
itime transactions.14  However, in the 1953 decision of Wilko v. Swan,15 the
Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause invoked in connection with a
Securities Act16 fraud claim was void as an invalid waiver of the substantive
statutory law.  Lower federal courts subsequently interpreted Wilko as creating
a “public policy” defense to the enforcement of arbitration agreements under
the FAA when statutory claims were at issue.17
A different rule, however, applied to arbitration agreements found in col-
lective bargaining agreements.  Four years after Wilko, the Supreme Court in
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills18 held that federal courts could enforce
arbitration clauses contained in such agreements, though the Court relied on
12 Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990).
13 See, e.g., Or. & W. Mortgage Sav. Bank v. Am. Mortgage Co., 35 F. 22 (C.C.D. Or.
1888); Jones v. Harris, 59 Miss. 214 (1881), overruled by IP Timberlands Operating Co. v.
Denmiss Corp., 726 So. 2d 96 (Miss. 1998); Allen v. Watson, 16 Johns. 205, 208-10 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1819); Kill v. Hollister, (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77
Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).
14 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, §§ 1-15, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (current version
as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
15 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa  (2000).
17 See, e.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827–28 (2d Cir.
1968).
18 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”),19 not
the FAA, for this holding.20  The Lincoln Mills Court also interpreted the
LMRA as both federalizing the contract law governing enforcement of collec-
tive bargaining agreements and as preempting contrary state law.21  In the 1960
Steelworkers Trilogy, the Court strongly endorsed arbitration as a mechanism
for resolving collective bargaining disputes, again relying on the LMRA.22
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII, which prohibited employment dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.23
Subsequent federal statutes extended legal protection to age,24 pregnancy,25
and disability.26  State legislatures passed parallel state statutes,27 and state
courts began to use contract and tort doctrines to soften the common-law rule
of employment-at-will.28  This explosion in employment rights—based on stat-
utory and common-law rights rather than contractual rights conferred by labor
agreements—was accompanied by a dramatic increase in litigated employment
claims.29
An issue soon arose over whether these new rights were arbitrable labor
claims or inarbitrable statutory claims.  The Supreme Court initially leaned
toward the latter, when it ruled in the 1974 case of Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co.30 that an employee’s arbitration of a just-cause claim under a labor
agreement did not foreclose subsequent litigation of a statutory discrimination
claim based on the same facts.  The Court denigrated arbitration as a forum for
19 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000).
20 Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 458.
21 Id. at 450-51, 456-57; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)
(State law tort claims that are “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the
labor contract” are preempted even if they are superficially labeled as tort claims rather than
claims for breach of contract.); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463
U.S. 1, 26 (1983) (holding that state law claims for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment are removable to federal court even if alternative actions are pleaded in the complaint);
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968) (holding that section 301
preemption is so expansive that claims based exclusively on state contract law not only are
preempted, but also become from their inception federal question claims, and any state law
cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining agreement is entirely displaced by
Section 301); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962) (holding
that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires this body of federal law
to displace any state law regarding the interpretation and enforcement of labor contracts).
22 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
25 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
26 Id. §§ 12101-12213.
27 R. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law:  Individual Autonomy and the Com-
pulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1863, 1876-77
(1994).
28 Id. at 1877-78.
29 See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns:  A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 10-12 (1988) (noting that the principal source of worker protection was
shifting from contractual rights negotiated through collective bargaining agreements to law-
created individual employment rights).
30
 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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resolving statutory employment claims, citing the informality of arbitral proce-
dures, the lack of labor arbitrators’ expertise on issues of substantive law, and
the absence of written opinions.31  However, in three subsequent cases collec-
tively known as the Mitsubishi Trilogy,32 the Court overruled Wilko and
enforced arbitration agreements covering antitrust, securities, and racketeering
laws.  The Court declared that “we are well past the time when judicial suspi-
cion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals
inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution.”33
The watershed employment arbitration case was the 1991 case of Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,34 in which the Supreme Court held that the
FAA permitted an employer to require a non-union employee to arbitrate rather
than litigate a federal age discrimination claim pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreement that the employee had been required to sign as a condition of
employment.  The Gilmer Court quoted with approval a statement in Mitsub-
ishi that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in
an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”35  The Court stated that objections of
unconscionability and procedural unfairness must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis, and that employment arbitration agreements would be enforced
absent “the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide
grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’”36
The Gilmer Court’s enforcement of the arbitration agreement in that case
signaled that the arbitral procedures available there met at least the minimum
threshold for preserving the “substantive rights afforded by the [employment
discrimination] statute”37 and for overcoming contract claims of unconsciona-
bility and procedural unfairness.  Beyond such a minimum threshold, however,
the Court provided little guidance as to when an employment arbitration agree-
ment would be sufficiently egregious to merit nonenforcement, leaving this to
be resolved (often inconsistently) by the lower courts.38
B. Jury Trial Waiver
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental right at the core of American
ideals of justice.  The trial by jury is so valued because it emphasizes the
empowerment of the common person while serving as a check on government
and judge.39  The Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he trial by jury is
justly dear to the American people.  It has always been an object of deep inter-
31 Id. at 56-58.
32 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
33 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626-27.
34 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
35 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
36 Id. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627).
37 Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
38 Bales, supra note 9, at 420.
39 Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 8, at 672.
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est and solicitude, and every encroachment upon it has been watched with great
jealousy.”40
The Seventh Amendment, ratified in 1791, provides that “[i]n Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of a jury trial shall be preserved . . . .”41  The Seventh Amendment is
limited to certain types of claims and is therefore narrower in scope then may
first appear.  Primarily, it only applies to “common law” claims that exceed
twenty dollars.42  Inflation has made the “twenty dollar” requirement obsolete
because, although 200 years ago that was a substantial sum of money, today
practically every suit exceeds that limit.43  Also, the Amendment only applies
to suits at common law, which means anything that would have required a jury
trial in eighteenth century England.44  Furthermore, the amendment only
applies to federal courts and not state courts, and is one of the few amendments
not incorporated into the Due Process Clause.45
The Seventh Amendment may be waived.46  However, courts have viewed
such waivers with suspicion and place the burden on the party seeking the
waiver.47  To determine if a jury trial waiver is valid, the federal courts have
held that such waivers must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.48  While
there is no universal test to determine what constitutes a “knowing and volun-
tary” waiver, the courts generally consider several factors.  These factors
include the negotiability of the waiver, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the
disparity in bargaining power between the two parties, and the degree of pro-
fessional or business acumen of the party opposing the waiver.49  When courts
apply this analysis, the party waiving her right to a jury trial is afforded a great
deal of protection against being coerced, misled, or swindled into waiver.
However, it is not the practice of courts to apply this standard to arbitration
clauses, but instead to apply contract levels of assent that offer less protection
to employees and consumers.50  The question of which standard should be used
is best illustrated by the spirited intellectual debate between Jean R. Sternlight
and Stephen J. Ware.  Jean Sternlight advocates the use of the knowing and
voluntary standard used under the civil jury trial waiver standard, while Ste-
phen Ware is a proponent of the state contract law standard under which arbi-
tration clauses are widely enforced.
Arbitration agreements and jury trial waiver agreements have been
addressed differently by the Supreme Court.  The principal case for the devel-
40 Chaffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 581 (1990) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830)).
41 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
42 Id.
43 The requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction only applies to suits exceeding a thresh-
old limit of $75,000.  28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
44 Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 8, at 672-73 (citing Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-21 (1987)).
45 Minn. & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
46 Ware, supra note 4, at 169.
47 Nat’l Acceptance Co. v. MYCA Prods. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 269, 270-71 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
48 Sternlight, The Rise and Spread, supra note 8, at 22.
49 Id.
50 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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opment of the jury trial waiver standard is the criminal case Johnson v. Zerbst,
in which the Supreme Court stated that “[a] waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”51 and held that a
defendant who failed to ask the court to appoint counsel and who stated that he
was ready to proceed to trial had not necessarily waived his right to counsel.52
Later, in Brady v. United States, the Court noted that “[w]aivers of constitu-
tional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences.”53  However, courts have not applied the principles of Johnson and
Brady consistently.54  While courts have recognized Johnson “as a framework
for establishing the criteria by which criminal law waivers must be judged,”55
the rules of criminal procedure also allow for waiver of other constitutional
rights without any knowledge or intent.56
Knowing waiver is generally required in the criminal context but seldom
is required in the civil context.57  However, some scholars urge that the crimi-
nal jury trial waiver should be applied in the civil jury trial waiver context.58
Two cases provide advocates of knowing consent with precedent from which to
argue that the Johnson framework should be applied to the context of civil jury
waiver.  First, in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., the Supreme Court examined
a provision contained in a contract between two corporations in which due pro-
cess rights were waived.59  The Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether the standard for waiver should be the same as that of a criminal pro-
ceeding because the agreement already satisfied the knowing standard.60  In a
criminal proceeding, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must be “voluntary,
knowing, and intelligently made,”61 and in Overmyer the Court found that the
waiver was fully negotiated, specifically bargained for, drafted by counsel, and
fully understood by both parties.62
The second case supporting the argument that knowing consent should be
required in the civil waiver forum is Fuentes v. Shevin.63  In Fuentes, the Court
51 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
52 Id. at 468-69.
53 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
54 Ware, supra note 4, at 181.
55 Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 491
(1981).
56 Ware, supra note 4, at 181 (citing Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note
8, at 709).
57 Id.
58 Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for
Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997); see also Eduard A. Lopez, Mandatory Arbi-
tration of Employment Discrimination Claims:  Some Alternative Grounds for Lai, Duffield
and Rosenberg, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 30 (2000) (“Application of such a standard
to a waiver of the right to jury trial in a civil action is consistent with Supreme Court declara-
tions that the Seventh Amendment right is a ‘fundamental guaranty of the rights and liberties
of the people’ and that ‘every reasonable presumption should be indulged against its
waiver.’”) (quoting Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882))).
59 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
60 Id. at 185-86.
61 Id. at 185.
62 Id. at 184-86.
63 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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again declined to address whether a “knowing and voluntary” standard applies,
but found the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable on grounds that it was not
“clear.”64  The plaintiff in Fuentes purchased household appliances pursuant to
an installment agreement.  The plaintiff missed a payment and the defendant
repossessed.  When the plaintiff challenged the repossession on due process
grounds, the defendant argued that a clause in the installment agreement had
waived her due process rights.  The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, find-
ing no waiver.65  The Court distinguished this case from Overmyer on the basis
that the difference in bargaining power disparately favored the seller, there
were no negotiated terms, the waiver was a necessary condition of the sale, and
there was no evidence that the purchaser was actually placed on notice of the
waiver or understood its significance.66
These cases together demonstrate the Court’s awareness that the enforce-
ment of contracts containing civil waiver agreements must be balanced by tak-
ing into account the broad range of fora in which waiver agreements are
imposed and the various levels of party intelligence and bargaining power.
While the cases do not involve arbitration agreements, they do involve con-
tracts between two parties in which a specific clause waives the rights of the
signee.  Arbitration agreements often offend basic notions of fairness and cause
unknowing waiver of rights in the same way that the agreement in Fuentes did
by insufficient clarity.  The Court stopped its analysis after determining that the
agreement was ambiguous.67  However, there are some indications in Fuentes
that had the agreement been more clearly drafted, the Court might have scruti-
nized the issues of involuntariness and unintelligent waiver.68  Some scholars
urge that the Court’s analysis, which seems to require civil waiver agreements
be fair, should be extended to arbitration agreements.69
Jean Sternlight has argued that in Overmyer and Fuentes, the Court
implicitly adopted a test for whether a party has contractually waived the jury
trial right without having sufficient notice or understanding of the waiver
clause.70  This four-factor test considers:  (1) the visibility and clarity of the
waiver provision; (2) the relative knowledge and economic power of the par-
ties; (3) the degree of voluntariness of the purported agreement; and (4) the
substantive fairness of the purported agreement.71  Furthermore, the courts





69 Sternlight, supra note 58, at 57.  Other proponents of this view set out the factors in a
slightly different manner. See Lopez, supra note 58, at 30-33 (Prof. Lopez states that
“[u]nder the test, courts examine whether contract terms were subject to negotiation, whether
there exists a great disparity in bargaining power between the parties, the business acumen of
the party opposing the waiver, and the conspicuousness of the jury waiver provision.”  He
further argues that, “[u]nder that test, it appears that most mandatory arbitration agreements
between employers and employees will be found unenforceable, because most employment
relationships involve a vast disparity in bargaining power, most employment contracts are
not negotiated, many if not most arbitration clauses in employment contracts are not conspic-
uous, and most employees do not possess a high degree of business acumen.”).
70 Sternlight, supra note 58, at 57.
71 Id. at 57-58.
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place the burden of proof on those parties asserting that the jury trial right has
been waived.72
Sternlight argues that “[t]his four-factor test is not only supported by pre-
cedent but also desirable as a matter of policy to protect against the inappropri-
ate waiver of constitutional rights.”73  However, Sternlight admits that simply
requiring that agreements be “clear” and entered into free of duress is not prac-
tical due to high transaction costs and the fact that many people will not read or
comprehend the agreement regardless of its clarity or level of duress.74  Ster-
nlight suggests that it is appropriate for courts to “take into account these real-
world problems by determining the relative knowledge and power of the parties
when considering whether an arbitration clause is sufficiently clear.”75  The
purpose of applying this standard is to prevent parties from unwittingly enter-
ing into arbitration agreements that are so unfair that no rational person would
agree to the terms.76
But determining fairness under the jury trial waiver standard requires
courts to weigh the knowledge and intelligence of the consumer or employee
against the substantive and procedural fairness of the arbitration agreement.
This leaves companies without any specific guidelines to follow to ensure
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.  It also gives courts too much discre-
tion in determining the competence of the employee.  Arbitration agreements
should be upheld when entered into by competent, knowledgeable parties, but
not enforced when a party was unaware of the agreement or was not given an
opportunity to fully understand the consequences.  Leaving the court to deter-
mine the competence of a party opposed to the enforcement of an arbitration
agreement will lead to inconsistent results because parties will have a tendency
to be untruthful about their competence and courts may simply not believe
those who truly did not know or understand what they signed.
Others argue that the Fuentes and Overmyer holdings are based on dated
law and that the Supreme Court would rule differently on similar facts today.77
Only two years after Fuentes, the Supreme Court suggested in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co.78 that the contract at issue, despite its take-it-or-leave-it nature,
waived due process rights the debtor would have retained.79 Mitchell seems to
stand for the notion that contractual waivers of due process rights would not be
governed by special default rules or limited to sophisticated parties.80  Regard-
less of the practicability of the Overmyer and Fuentes four-factor test, it
appears that the Court would no longer require knowing consent but would
only apply contract standards of assent.
72 Sternlight, The Rise and Spread, supra note 8, at 22.
73 Sternlight, supra note 58, at 58.
74 Id. at 58-59.
75 Id. at 59.
76 Id.
77 Ware, supra note 4, at 187-88.
78 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
79 Ware, supra note 4, at 185.
80 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 477-78
(1993).
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C. Arbitral Contractualism
Since the FAA was enacted in 1925, the courts have become more willing
to enforce mandatory arbitration agreements by the same standards as any other
contract.  This trend derives from section 2 of the FAA, which provides that
contracts to arbitrate shall be enforceable on any grounds “as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.”81  This language places arbitration
agreements on the same footing as any other contract by reserving the power of
the states to apply state contract law to such agreements.  As the Supreme
Court explained in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, applicable contract
defenses, which include fraud, duress, coercion, or unconscionability, may be
applied in determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements without vio-
lating section 2.82  However, courts may not invalidate agreements under state
laws that single out or are applicable only to arbitration agreements.  By enact-
ing section 2, Congress precluded the states from isolating arbitration agree-
ments for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed upon
the same footing as other contracts.83
This doctrine is at the center of the debate over the level of notice or
consent required to bind an individual to an arbitration provision because the
FAA mandates that enforcement of arbitration provisions must turn on contract
standards of consent.84  This level of consent is significantly lower than the
“knowing and voluntary” consent standard required for waiver under the jury
trial standard examined above.  Under contract law, formation of a contract
does not require mutual assent but only mutual manifestations of assent.85  This
standard offers much less protection to the unwary consumer or prospective
employee because it permits companies to use standardized boilerplate and
form contracts to show consent based merely on a signature or mark and not on
a showing of mutual understanding or even knowledge of the contract
provisions.
There are two parts of arbitral contractualism that go beyond section 2 in
requiring the use of state contract law to determine enforceability of arbitration
agreements:  the doctrines of preemption and separability.86  In a series of cases
that begin with the 1984 decision of Southland Corp. v. Keating,87 the Supreme
Court interpreted section 2 to mean that state laws singling out arbitration
agreements for disfavored treatment are preempted by the FAA, whereas state
laws governing contracts generally are not.88  In Southland, a California statute
required jury trials for franchisor-franchisee disputes, but the Supreme Court
struck down the statute and held that “[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act,
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
81 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
82 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996).
83 Id.
84 Ware, supra note 4, at 171.
85 Id.
86 Bales, supra note 9, at 422-23, 426.
87 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
88 See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686; see also Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitra-
tion Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 408 (2004).
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which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”89  This preemp-
tion doctrine essentially removes any power the states would otherwise have to
single out arbitration contracts for “inferior treatment.”
The second doctrine is derived from section 4 of the FAA and is known as
the separability doctrine.90  Section 4 permits a party to obtain specific enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement by a federal court that would have had juris-
diction over the underlying dispute (e.g., federal question jurisdiction created
by a Title VII employment discrimination claim).91  Section 4 directs that the
court “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . .
is not in issue . . . shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitra-
tion in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”92  Section 3 similarly
requires a court to stay legal proceedings to permit specific enforcement of
enforceable arbitration agreements.93
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., the
Supreme Court held that section 4 of the FAA required arbitration agreements
to be viewed as two separate contracts.94  These two separate contracts con-
sisted of the arbitration contract and the broader terms of the contract, known as
the “container” contract.  The Court determined that enforceability of the
“container” contract should be determined by the arbitrators and the arbitration
contract should be determined by the courts.95  This doctrine, much like the
preemption doctrine, removes power from the states and parties and reserves
the enforcement of arbitration agreements to the courts so they can protect and
further promulgate the judicial acceptance of arbitration under the FAA.
III. CURRENT STANDARDS
Because enforcement of arbitration agreements has been reserved to the
states by section 2 of the FAA,96 the state courts have used different standards
in determining whether the parties to the agreement have sufficient notice of
the terms to effectively waive their rights to a jury trial.  State contract law also
determines the level of notice and consent required to bind a party contractually
to an arbitration agreement.97  While few courts have addressed arbitration
agreements under anything other than state contract law, employee and con-
sumer advocates argue that the other standards offer more protection of consti-
tutional rights and should therefore be incorporated into the FAA.  However,
each of these other standards also has weaknesses when applied in the context
of arbitration agreements.
89 Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 10.
90 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 9 U.S.C. § 3.
94 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403 (1967).
95 Id. at 403-04.
96 9 U.S.C § 2.
97 See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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A. Knowing and Voluntary Standard
The few courts that have applied the knowing and voluntary standard have
not used precisely the same language or factors, but all return to the basic suffi-
cient notice question:  Was the employee’s or consumer’s waiver knowing and
voluntary?  This standard is very similar to the jury trial waiver standard and
provides employees and consumers a similarly high degree of protection.  In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court stated in a footnote that
“[i]n determining the effectiveness of any such waiver, a court would have to
determine at the outset that the employee’s consent to the settlement was volun-
tary and knowing.”98  (This dicta was intended to address the enforceability of
an employee’s post-dispute waiver of Title VII rights.99)  One problem is that
the Supreme Court failed to define “knowing and voluntary.”  Rather, the Court
produced a standard that only provides a description of the level of notice an
employee must have at the contracting stage.
Although the language used by courts applying the knowing and voluntary
standard varies slightly, there are two components of the knowledge require-
ment:  (1) what information the employee or consumer must know, and (2) to
what extent the employee or consumer must know, comprehend, and under-
stand that information.100  In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,
applicants for jobs in the securities industry were told that they were signing up
for a pre-employment test; the employer directed the applicants to sign in the
relevant place without giving the applicants an opportunity to read the
forms.101  When the employees sued alleging rape, harassment, and sexual
abuse, the district court compelled arbitration based on the forms.102  The
employees appealed, arguing they were unaware they signed any document that
contained an arbitration clause and were in no other way on notice that they
were agreeing to forego their rights to a jury trial.103  The Ninth Circuit looked
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer and held that employees cannot be
bound by an agreement to arbitrate unless it was entered into knowingly.104
The court examined the language of the agreement and determined that
because the agreement did not describe the types of claims subject to arbitra-
tion, the agreement could not have been entered into knowingly.105  Courts
taking this approach typically consider any actual negotiations, whether the
clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the conspicuousness of the
clause, the disparity in bargaining power between the parties, and the business
acumen or sophistication of the parties.106
Nonetheless, this standard fails to delineate how far courts can go to
ensure knowing and voluntary consent.  This is because terms themselves are
extremely vague.  “Knowing” may simply mean “deliberate or conscious” or it
98 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974).
99 Makins v. District of Columbia, 277 F.3d 544, 547 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
100 Jessica Wilen Berg, Understanding Waiver, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 281, 314 (2003).
101 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1301 (9th Cir. 1994).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 1303.
104 Id. at 1304.
105 Id. at 1305.
106 Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 8, at 680-81.
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can mean “well-informed”; notice may be either actual or constructive.107
Others have said that knowledge requires both understanding of the current
situation as well as understanding of the consequences of different decisions.108
Notice and consent are two conjoining elements of knowledge:  A party nor-
mally cannot consent to a contract term of which the party was not given
notice.109  The FAA section 3 requires courts to stay judicial proceedings for
“any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing . . . .”110
Courts consistently have held that while the FAA requires a writing, “it does
not require [that the writing] be signed” by the parties.111  Thus, it is usually
sufficient for the party seeking to compel arbitration to show that the other
party received a written copy of the arbitration agreement.
In the employment context, this means that an arbitration contract is
formed when an employer notifies an employee in writing that continued
employment will constitute assent to an arbitration agreement, and the
employee continues employment.112  The argument for enforcement is strong-
est when the employer can show that the employee had actual knowledge that
she was agreeing to arbitration in lieu of litigation.113  A prudent employer
wishing to implement an employment arbitration policy will give an employee
a copy of a clearly-drafted arbitration policy several days ahead of time, give
the employee an opportunity to consult an attorney,114 and then have the
employee sign an acknowledgment stating that she has received and read the
policy and that she understands and agrees to it.115  Under these circumstances,
courts are likely to enforce the arbitration agreement even if the employee later
claims she lacked actual knowledge, such as if she signed the agreement with-
out bothering to read its contents.116  However, not all employers take such
pains to ensure knowledgeable consent, and often courts do not require it.  The
107 Daniel P. O’Gorman, A State of Disarray:  The “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard for
Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
73, 82 (2005).
108 Berg, supra note 100, at 314 & n.162.
109 See, e.g., Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 n.3
(D. Mass. 2004) (“[A]n employee’s knowledge of the [employer’s] offer is obviously a
necessity for the inference of acceptance to hold.”).
110 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
111 See, e.g., Tinder v. Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Valero
Refining, Inc. v. M/T Lauberhorn, 813 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987)).
112 See May v. Higbee Co., 372 F.3d 757, 764 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing numerous cases). But
cf. Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 833-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), rev’d, 847
N.E.2d 99 (Ill. 2006) (holding that arbitration agreements presented to employees which are
a condition of continued employment are not “voluntary” from the perspective of employees,
and therefore are unenforceable).
113 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 147 n.3.
114 See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381, 384 (6th Cir.
2005) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that recited that employees had the right to
consult an attorney, because “in reality, they had no opportunity to exercise that right
because they had to sign the agreements on the spot”).
115 See, e.g., Pennington v. Frisch’s Rests., Inc., 147 F. App’x 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2005)
(enforcing employment arbitration agreements where employees signed a form acknowledg-
ing that they had “received, read, and underst[ood]” the agreements).
116 Campbell, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
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same is true in the consumer context, where companies often make little effort
to ensure that consumers understand that they are agreeing to arbitration.
The “voluntary” standard is equally ambiguous.  The term itself is difficult
to define because it is related to obscurities such as “free-will” and “free-
choice,” both of which have been the subject of judicial debate for centuries.117
Few would doubt that an average employee presented by her employer with an
employment arbitration agreement on a “take-it-or-be-fired” basis faces sub-
stantial economic pressure to sign the agreement.118  The same is true of con-
sumers because many products and services are impossible to obtain without
agreeing to arbitration.  Some courts have concluded from this that pre-dispute
employment and consumer arbitration agreements are not voluntary and there-
fore are unenforceable.119  However, employees must accept on a “take-it-or-
be-fired” basis a substantial number of other employment terms, such as rate-
of-pay and work-hours, and consumers likewise must accept a plethora of other
terms along with the arbitration agreement.120  A court refusing to enforce arbi-
tration agreements but not other terms or conditions of employment or
purchase, on the ground that economic coercion makes the agreements involun-
tary, runs afoul of the rule of FAA preemption that state law must treat arbitra-
tion agreements no worse than other contractual agreements.121  If “voluntary”
means “free from economic pressure,” then the voluntariness requirement is
preempted by the FAA; if “voluntary” means something less, then it provides
considerably less protection for employees and consumers than most advocates
of the “knowing and voluntary” standard would prefer.
Although the Lai court primarily relied on Gilmer and the knowing and
voluntary standard, it also used the “where appropriate” standard of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to reinforce its holding due to the statutory nature of the
claims.122  However, it is possible that even the Lai court determined its use of
the knowing and voluntary standard required the reinforcement of another stan-
dard that incorporates similar language.123
B. “Where Appropriate” Standard
The “where appropriate” standard derives its name from the language of
section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”), which states, “[w]here
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law . . . arbitration[ ] is encouraged
117 O’Gorman, supra note 107, at 82-83.
118 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 58.
119 See, e.g., Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 816 N.E.2d 826, 833-34 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004),
rev’d, 847 N.E.2d 99 (Ill. 2006); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889,
893 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that pre-dispute arbitration agreement was procedurally uncon-
scionable because it was a prerequisite for employment).
120 LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 638 (2d ed. 2005).
121 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Lauri Washington
Sawyer, Case Note, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson:  The Implementation of
the Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act or an Unjustified Intrusion Into State Sover-
eignty?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1996).
122 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994).
123 Id.
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to resolve disputes . . . .”124  However, a connection between the “where appro-
priate” standard and the “knowing and voluntary” standard is found in Senator
Dole’s comments regarding the 1991 CRA section 118 in which he stated that
the arbitration provision encourages arbitration only “where the parties know-
ingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods.”125  The Senator’s comments
do not explain how the standard should be applied.
The First Circuit applied the “where appropriate” standard in Rosenberg v.
Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.126  In Rosenberg, the plaintiff was
required to sign a U-4 form, a securities exchange registration form containing
a mandatory arbitration clause, as a prerequisite to employment.127  The court
held that the enforcement of the agreement was inappropriate because the
employer never provided the plaintiff with the rules or procedure of arbitration
as provided by the agreement.128
The Rosenberg holding demonstrates the broad discretion this standard
gives courts as to what is or is not appropriate.  The plaintiff in Rosenberg was
aware that she had signed an agreement to arbitrate but was not provided with
the rules of arbitration as required by the agreement.129  Had the court applied
the knowing and voluntary standard, the court may have enforced the agree-
ment because the employee knew that she had signed an agreement to arbitrate.
Rosenberg puts the burden on the employer to ensure that the employee is
properly informed and on notice regarding the arbitration agreement, though
the language of the standard itself does not require this.130  Even the Rosenberg
court acknowledged that the “where appropriate” standard is not expressed in
the text of the FAA or at common law.131
Besides the fact that the 1991 CRA only applies to statutory employment
claims, the problem with the standard as applied to arbitration agreements is
that it gives too much discretion to courts in determining what constitutes an
“appropriate” situation to enforce arbitration.132  Widespread application of the
“appropriate” standard in determining enforceability of arbitration agreements
would lead to inconsistent results.  Perhaps for that reason, few courts have
adopted it.
C. State Contract Law
By far the most common source of authority courts apply in determining
the enforceability of arbitration agreements is the contract law of the state in
which the dispute arose.  For example, in Cooper v. MRM Investment Co., the
plaintiff worked as a restaurant manager.133  She sued, alleging sexual harass-
124 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081.
125 137 CONG. REC. S15472, S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
126 Rosenberg v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
127 Id. at 3.
128 Id. at 19-20.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 18.
131 Id. at 19.
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081.
133 Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 2004).
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ment and constructive discharge.134  When the employer filed a motion to com-
pel arbitration based on a predispute arbitration agreement, the district court
dismissed the motion in part because the arbitration agreement did not explic-
itly state that the employee was surrendering her right to a jury trial.135  The
Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting the employee’s argument that an arbitration
agreement must contain an express waiver.136  The court reasoned that “the loss
of the right to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an
agreement to arbitrate.”137
The Cooper decision demonstrates the shift from the knowing and volun-
tary standard and the protection it affords employees and consumers to the con-
tractual standard that favors the drafter of the agreement.  The Cooper court
rejected the knowing and voluntary standard but at the same time found that it
is consistent with the contractual standard because, while the knowing and vol-
untary standard requires the agreement to be “clear,” contract law focuses on
the “clear and obvious consequence.”138  The court tried to draw an analogy
between a “clear” or express waiver and the allegedly obvious consequence
that an agreement to arbitrate precludes a jury trial.139
The problem, however, is the court’s assumption that a person signing an
arbitration agreement necessarily understands its consequences.  This requires
the employee or consumer to understand what arbitration is and the basic sub-
stantive and procedural differences between arbitration and a jury trial.  How-
ever, it is unlikely that a person holding an entry level position in (for example)
the fast-food industry will clearly understand the “obvious consequences” of
arbitration,140 which usually include curtailed discovery, higher forum fees,
and no jury trials.
While it is improbable that most employees or consumers fully compre-
hend the consequences of signing an arbitration agreement, another common
problem is the lack of notice that the employee or consumer has that she signed
or agreed to an arbitration agreement.141  Arbitration agreements are often con-
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 506.
137 Id. (quoting Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.
2001)).
138 Id. at 508.
139 Id.
140 See Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 954-55 (N.D. Ind.
2000) (In holding that arbitration agreements must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily
to comply with the ADA, the court stated that it “is hard-pressed to believe that the average
job applicant at Ryan’s competing for a job washing dishes or waiting tables could possibly
pick-up on the intricacies of the Agreement and understand the contractual scenario
involved, and then boldly pose questions to the manager conducting his or her interview or
consult with an attorney before signing.”).
141 See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).  The Seventh Circuit
enforced an arbitration agreement contained in a warranty booklet that accompanied the
computer sent to the consumer.  No signature was asked for or obtained, but the court upheld
the clause because the consumer could have read the clause and returned the computer if she
did not accept the terms.
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tained in long and complex boilerplate documents,142 and consumers and
employees often do not have time or feel pressured into skimming or not read-
ing the contract before signing and therefore are not aware of the arbitration
agreement contained in the contract.143  Courts often are willing to enforce con-
tracts where the arbitration clause was in small type,144 where the arbitration
clause did not even mention arbitration but only incorporated another document
by reference,145 and where the arbitration agreement was imposed retroac-
tively.146  Furthermore, arbitration agreements often are presented by salesper-
sons or supervisors who either do not understand the agreement themselves or
do not have the time or desire to explain the terms to the non-drafting party.147
The result is that it is common for courts to compel arbitration against the
weaker, non-drafting party who either did not know of the clause or was not
given the opportunity to consider the terms and ask questions.
The problems with the contract law standard result from the rigid objectiv-
ity under which arbitration agreements are examined.148  The standard does not
take into account the reality that form employment arbitration agreements are
generally drafted by highly-educated lawyers and presented to job applicants or
consumers by supervisors or salespersons who are coached by the drafting
party and who do not explain the terms but only encourage a rushed assent.
Not only does the drafting party have ultimate control over the terms, but the
supervisors and salespersons who present the contracts often have their own
agenda, possibly the collection of a sales commission or not having to continue
searching for needed job applicants, which may encourage them to present an
overly optimistic or misleading depiction of the contract to the weaker party.149
142 See Painewebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank, 260 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir.
2001); Howell v. NHC Healthcare-Fort Sanders, Inc., 109 S.W.3d 731, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003).
143 See Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (The employee
was unaware that she signed an arbitration agreement, claiming “I never had an opportunity
to read the Code of Conduct form before I signed it. . . .  Moreover, I felt pressured to sign
the form on the spot because my supervisor demanded that I sign it immediately.”).
144 See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 176-77, 182-84 (3d Cir. 1999)
(enforcing a consumer arbitration agreement contained in small print on the back and bottom
of a form contract); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834-35 (8th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing an employee arbitration agreement that was contained on page thirty-one of an
employee handbook).
145 See R.J. O’Brien & Assoc., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1995) (The com-
modity forms did not specifically mention arbitration, but the court enforced the arbitration
award because, under state contract law, “[a] contract . . . need not contain an explicit arbi-
tration clause if it validly incorporates by reference an arbitration clause in another
document.”).
146 See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir. 1996) (Despite the fact that
the NASD rules did not require or mention arbitration when the employee signed the con-
tract, the court enforced arbitration against the employee because the NASD rules may “be
amended from time to time.”).
147 See Painewebber Inc., 260 F.3d at 456; Howell, 109 S.W.3d at 732.
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 & cmt. b (1981).
149 See Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 1998) (Enforc-
ing an arbitration agreement against a consumer, the court stated that parties to a contract,
dealing at an arms length, are not under a duty to explain the terms of the contract.  Further-
more, the court stated that the consumer’s reliance on the false statement that the contract
“did not compromise any of [their] rights” was not reasonable.).
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Until a new standard is devised, courts will continue to permit companies to
make misleading statements and encourage assent without reading or opportu-
nity for inquiry and then hold the weaker parties responsible for relying on the
word of the stronger party.
Although the contract standard allows an employee to claim fraud, duress,
unconscionability, or lack of mutual assent, the employee’s right to a jury trial
is less protected than under the other standards because under contract law each
party bears the burden of his or her own ignorance.  This places many job
seekers who lack even a high school education on the same footing as the
highly-educated employer and the highly-educated lawyers who drafted the
arbitration agreement.150  Not only are many job seekers poorly-educated about
arbitration, they are often in financial need and primarily concerned with get-
ting a job so they can pay rent and feed their family.  It is unfair that thousands
of these individuals are permitted to trade their right to a jury trial for minimum
wage, at-will employment without fully understanding the consequences of
their actions.  Something more is needed to ensure justice for the average
American worker.
IV. THE OWBPA ALTERNATIVE
None of the tests already discussed appear to strike an appropriate balance
between the importance of protecting the jury trial rights conferred by the Sev-
enth Amendment and the preference for enforcing arbitration agreements.  The
standard addressed in this Part has been applied in a context similar to
mandatory arbitration agreements, and with modification could become a use-
ful standard by which companies can ensure that arbitration agreements will be
enforced and courts can ensure fairness to both parties.
A. The OWBPA Standard
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act is the only antidiscrimination
legislation explicitly requiring that waivers be knowing and voluntary.151  This
heightened standard was enacted in response to the common practice of
150 See Parsley v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. C-3-97-394, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22891, at *15
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 1998) (enforcing an arbitration agreement against a “sixty-three year
old woman with little education and little or no experience in similar transactions”).
151 Section 201 of the OWBPA adds subsection (f)(1) to section 7 of the ADEA and
provides:
(f)(1) An individual may not waive any right or claim under this Act unless the waiver is know-
ing and voluntary.  Except as provided in paragraph (2), a waiver may not be considered know-
ing and voluntary unless at a minimum—
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer that is
written in a manner calculated to be understood by such individual, or by the average
individual eligible to participate;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under this Act;
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver
is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in addition
to anything of value to which the individual already is entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the
agreement;
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employers offering older employees early retirement severance packages.152  A
condition of these packages was the employee’s waiver of any past age dis-
crimination claims against the employer.153  However, the severances—and the
waivers—often were coercive, especially when juxtaposed with the looming
specter of a mass layoff.  Employees presented with these severances and waiv-
ers believed, often justifiably, that the only alternative to acceptance was dis-
charge.154  Once the employee accepted, the waiver effectively terminated any
inquiry as to whether employees had been victims of unlawful
discrimination.155
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was passed in 1967 to pro-
hibit age discrimination in the employment context.156  Section 4(f)(2) of the
ADEA provided an exception to the Act’s prohibitions on differential treatment
of older workers if that treatment occurs as part of a “bona fide employee bene-
fit plan.”157  This exception amounted to an employer’s affirmative defense
against a charge of discriminatory treatment.  The Supreme Court endorsed this
view in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts when it determined that
section 4(f)(2) required no showing of cost justification for any discriminatory
treatment under an allegedly bona fide plan.158  This rejection of the cost-justi-
fication rule meant that employers were now virtually free to discriminate on
the basis of age in the area of non-fringe, employee benefits.159
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to consider the
agreement; or
(ii) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment
termination program offered to a group or class of employees, the individual is given a
period of at least 45 days within which to consider the agreement;
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least 7 days following the execution of
such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not
become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has expired . . . .
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 201, 104 Stat. 978, 983
(1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (2000)).
152 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-664, at 25 (1990) (Congress noted that employees are frequently
laid off due to global competition and mergers and that “[e]mployers know that if hundreds
of thousands of employees are simply laid off with no benefits or terminated for cause, the
result may be bitterness and lawsuits.  Accordingly, employers have come to rely heavily on
early retirement and other exit incentive programs to reduce their workforce.”).
153 1 HOWARD C. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 4.10, at 4-36 (2d ed. 1994).
154 Id. at 4-35 to 4-36.
155 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-664, at 23 (“[W]orkers are given no reason to suspect age dis-
crimination and often are not even aware of their rights under the ADEA.  For them, waiving
all rights and claims through a general release effectively chills any meaningful inquiry into
whether they are the victims of unlawful age discrimination.”  “The House and Senate hear-
ing records are replete with evidence of older workers who have been manipulated or
coerced into waiving their rights under the ADEA.  This evidence, although anecdotal, paints
a disturbing picture of waiver practices.”).
156 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
157 Id. § 4(f)(2), 81 Stat. at 603.
158 Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 175 (1989).
159 David A. Niles, The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act:  Painting Age-Discrimina-
tion Law with a Watery Brush, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 869, 877 (1992).
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In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA by adding a provision, now known
as the OWBPA, specifically to overturn the Betts decision.160  The purpose of
the amendment was to statutorily require adherence to consent and notice stan-
dards and to ensure that employee waivers were truly knowing and
voluntary.161
The OWBPA creates a presumption that a waiver is not knowing and vol-
untary unless seven requirements are met.162  However, even the seven require-
ments are only a threshold matter, and the statute still permits the courts to find
the agreement unenforceable even if the seven requirements are met.163  The
requirements are as follows:  (1) the waiver must be part of an agreement
between the individual and the employer that is written in a manner calculated
to be understood by such an individual, or by the average individual eligible to
participate; (2) the waiver must specifically refer to rights or claims arising
under this Act; (3) the individual must not waive rights or claims that may arise
after the date the waiver is executed; (4) the individual must waive rights or
claims only in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to
which the individual is already entitled; (5) the individual must be advised in
writing to consult with an attorney prior to executing the agreement; (6) the
individual must be given a period of at least twenty-one days within which to
consider the agreement; and (7) the agreement must provide that for a period of
at least seven days following the execution of such agreement, the individual
may revoke the agreement, and the agreement shall not become effective or
enforceable until the revocation period has expired.164
The application of this test helps ensure that the employee waiving her
rights understands exactly what she has done.  While several provisions need to
be modified or removed to be applicable to employment and consumer arbitra-
tion agreements, most of the Act is already well suited for protecting the
employee and consumer at the contracting stage.  In creating the OWBPA,
Congress took into account the diversity of employees’ comprehension levels
as well as the preference for time to consider and seek counsel regarding the
agreement.  Furthermore, Congress recognized that employers are primarily
concerned with their own interests in drafting waiver clauses and tend to pres-
sure or rush employees into signing them.  These are concerns that the current
notice tests for consumer and employment minimize or ignore altogether.
B. Appropriate Modifications
While the OWBPA creates a higher standard than the courts currently use
in examining mandatory arbitration agreements, there are differences between
160 See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978,
978 (1990).
161 See S. REP. NO. 101-263, at 5 (1990); H.R. REP. NO. 101-664, at 6 (1990) (both stating
that the OWBPA was passed to ensure that “older workers are not coerced or manipulated
into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the ADEA”).
162 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(G) (2000).
163 Id. § 626(f)(1) (“[A] waiver may not be considered knowing and voluntary unless at a
minimum [the waiver meets certain requirements].”); see also 1 EGLIT, supra note 153,
§ 5.65.
164 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(G).
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the employee retirement plan and arbitration agreement contexts that require
some of the OWBPA requirements to be modified to fit the arbitration context.
The first part of the OWBPA standard addresses the complexity of the
agreement and the need for the employee to comprehend fully the agreements’
terms.165  This part of the OWBPA standard requires, for example, that the
waiver agreement be typed in an easily readable size font, in the waiving
party’s vernacular language, and that the agreement must be written in layper-
son’s terms rather than lawyer’s terms.166  This requirement provides the basis
for sufficient notice to an employee or consumer, and the remaining sections
build upon this core requirement of understanding.  The section does not
require modification to be applicable in the arbitration context because this
“understanding requirement” would further the protection of consumers’ and
employees’ rights and ensure enforcement of such agreements.
The second OWBPA requirement limits waiver to include only rights spe-
cifically arising under the Act.167  This requirement narrows the waiver to
include only age discrimination claims as opposed to the numerous claims that
could arise in the mandatory arbitration context.  Employment arbitration
agreements usually encompass, at a minimum, all legal claims that an
employee might assert against an employer, such as sexual harassment, torts,
discrimination, and contract claims; consumer arbitration agreements often are
intended to cover not only contract claims, but also claims brought under con-
sumer-protection statutes.  In applying the OWBPA to mandatory arbitration
agreements, it would be necessary to broaden the standard to include all claims
arising under the specific arbitration agreement at issue.  While this modifica-
tion broadens the standard, it also narrows what the parties can claim is covered
by the agreement because only claims specifically included under the agree-
ment would be subject to mandatory arbitration.  This would not preclude a
company from drafting an expansive agreement that would include virtually all
claims, but it would require the company to specifically enumerate all claims
that the consumer or employee is waiving.168  This modification enhances
employee notice and appropriately places the burden on the company to enu-
merate the claims subject to arbitration.
The greatest difference between the OWBPA and mandatory arbitration
agreements is the third requirement.  The OWBPA is concerned with the
waiver of past claims, while consumer and employment arbitration agreements
are designed to be prospective.169  Through enacting the OWBPA, Congress
recognized the need to protect older workers’ rights to sue on past claims, but it
has not extended that protection to consumers’ and employees’ rights to sue on
165 Id. § 626(f)(1)(A).
166 For cases illustrating these issues, see supra notes 109-16.
167 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B).
168 This requirement is not contrary to the judicial policy of enforcing arbitration agree-
ments, but only requires that enforcement of arbitration agreements be limited to the explicit
terms of the agreement.  This is consistent with the contract law principle of determining
enforcement based on the “four corners” of the contract.
169 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C); see also Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (providing an example of a prospective waiver provision).
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prospective claims.170  Congress should continue to provide a great amount of
protection to older workers, but an equal amount of protection should be pro-
vided to individuals who have not yet been wronged.  It is inconsistent to pro-
vide more protection to someone who has already been discriminated against
and therefore has a greater probability of being aware of her cause of action
and, on the other hand, less protection to a new employee or consumer who is
unaware of what future claims may arise.  It would make little sense to apply
the third requirement to mandatory arbitration agreements because there are no
past claims at the contracting stage.  However, while removal of this require-
ment is an appropriate modification to the standard, its presence in the OWBPA
provides even greater weight to the argument that a higher level of protection is
necessary in consumer and employment arbitration.
Under the fourth OWBPA requirement, an employee can only waive her
right to a jury trial in exchange for consideration that is in addition to any
retirement package to which the employee is already entitled.171  For example,
if the employee is already entitled to a retirement package, the employer would
have to provide some form of valuable bonus before a court will consider the
employees’ waiver valid.  In the mandatory arbitration realm, most courts have
not required additional consideration because the prospective employee is enti-
tled to nothing at the contracting stage.  In the view of some states, upon sign-
ing the arbitration agreement, the prospective employee is then entitled to
employment, which could be considered a form of consideration.  However,
employment as consideration is illusory because the vast majority of employees
signing arbitration agreements are “at-will” employees who can be fired at any
time and for any nondiscriminatory reason.
Consideration serves an important function in the OWBPA and should
serve a similar function in employment and consumer arbitration:  It enhances
notice.  For example, if an employee receives a twenty-five cent hourly raise or
stock options in return for signing an arbitration agreement, that employee is
more likely to notice the agreement and consider it carefully.  The considera-
tion functions as a signaling device.  The FAA should require, as the OWBPA
does now, that an at-will employee receive some form of consideration other
than at-will employment in return for signing an arbitration agreement.
The fifth requirement of the OWBPA is that the employee must be advised
in writing to consult an attorney before executing the agreement.172  This
requirement impresses on the worker the significance of the waiver while
ensuring she is at least aware that seeking counsel is a good idea.  In the
mandatory arbitration context, nearly all employees and consumers are ignorant
of the fact that the guidance of legal counsel could be in their best interest.
This is largely because companies tend to rush employees and consumers into
170 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-664, at 31 (1990) (“[O]lder workers are in an unequal bargaining
position when faced with a situation that leaves them very few alternatives.  They are often
coerced or manipulated into signing waivers as a condition of their participation in exit
incentive or early retirement programs.”).
171 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D).
172 Id. § 626(f)(1)(E).
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signing without sufficient time to ask questions.173  While it is likely that many
employees and consumers will fail to obtain counsel even after being advised to
do so, either because they cannot afford to do so or because they simply choose
not to do so, the modest requirement of a writing advising the prospective
employee to seek counsel would raise awareness and notice of the waiver.
Awareness of the waiver is most important when the common atmosphere
of signing an employment contract is one of pressure mixed with optimism
about the new job.  The problem is not that prospective employees are all illit-
erate and need a lawyer to understand the agreement.  The problem is that when
a manager says “you don’t need a lawyer” or “you don’t have to read the whole
thing because it doesn’t affect your rights,” a misrepresentation is made to the
prospective employee by an authority figure.  Not only does the prospective
employee want to believe the new boss, but the employee is under pressure not
to challenge or contradict her.  The prospective employee who has received a
written notice advising her or him to seek legal advice, while perhaps unable to
afford counsel, would be more likely to seek information through the Internet,
the library, or a knowledgeable friend.
The final two requirements of the OWBPA concern the time allowed for
consideration and revocation of the waiver agreement.174  These requirements
ensure that the worker has sufficient time to seek counsel and consider the
waiver before execution and provides a way out if she later decides against
waiver.  In the mandatory arbitration context, such rigid requirements would be
counterproductive because prospective employees usually have a financially-
driven desire to begin work as soon as possible, and employers have a similar
desire due to production demands or service quotas.  However, even a short
time to consider the arbitration agreement would give the prospective employee
time to consult an attorney or conduct independent research and would also
help alleviate some of the pressure or duress that the prospective employee may
encounter when entering into an employment contract.
To accommodate the incentives of both the prospective employee and
employer to begin work, a fair compromise would be to allow the employee to
begin work while the execution of the arbitration agreement is still pending.  It
is unlikely that a dispute would arise within the first week of employment, and
therefore the employer is not placing itself at grave risk by allowing the
employee to consider the agreement for a few days before executing the agree-
ment.  While no universal amount of time will suffice for all situations, grant-
ing a prospective employee some amount of time to consider the arbitration
agreement helps ensure sufficient notice of the arbitration agreement and
ensures the employer that the agreement will be enforced.
173 See Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (The employee
was unaware that she signed an arbitration agreement, claiming “I never had an opportunity
to read the Code of Conduct form before I signed it. . . .  Moreover, I felt pressured to sign
the form on the spot because my supervisor demanded that I sign it immediately.”).
174 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)-(G).
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C. Proposed Amendment
The FAA should be amended to reflect the recent explosion of the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements between parties that are unequal in sophisti-
cation and bargaining power.  The amendment should not discourage arbitra-
tion or reflect negatively upon it but should only go so far as to balance the
playing field between highly sophisticated and powerful employers or retailers
and the average person applying for a job or purchasing goods or services.  The
following amendment is an appropriate addition to the end of section 2 of the
FAA175:
However, if an arbitration agreement is entered into as part of an employment rela-
tionship or a consumer transaction, the employee’s or consumer’s agreement to arbi-
tration must be knowing and voluntary and memorialized by that party’s dated
signature.  A knowing and voluntary waiver will be found to exist where:  (1) the
waiver clause has been written in a manner calculated to be understood by the waiv-
ing party; (2) the waiver clause explicitly states all the claims covered by the arbitra-
tion agreement; (3) the waiving party has been provided with the rules and
procedures of the arbitration agreement; (4) the waiving party has been advised in
writing to consult an attorney; (5) the waiver has been accompanied by consideration
that the waiving party understands is being received in return for the surrendering of
a right; and (6) the waiving party is given at least seven days after signing the agree-
ment to return the consideration, revoke the agreement, and, if the company has made
arbitration a condition of employment or purchase, thereby void the underlying trans-
action.  For purposes of this section a “consumer” is defined as a person who enters
into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and this
“knowing and voluntary” requirement does not apply to the employment contracts of
executive officers.
This amendment has several advantages over the FAA’s current section 2
because it offers greater protection to unsophisticated or unsuspecting parties
while guaranteeing employers and retailers assurance that the arbitration agree-
ment will be enforced.  The amendment offers protection that Congress has
already recognized as appropriate in the context of protecting employees from
waiver of rights under the OWBPA.176  Similar to the OWBPA, the proposed
standard specifically provides requirements that, if fulfilled, will result in a pre-
sumption that the waiver was “knowing and voluntary.”
The amendment takes into account the reality that it is common for
employees and consumers to contract away their Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial without notice or understanding.  The requirements ensure that the
waiving party actually knows something about arbitration before assenting to
an arbitration clause.  It also prevents employers or retailers from misleading
the waiving party regarding the nature and consequences of the contract.  Fur-
thermore, the requirements are not unduly burdensome on the drafting party but
175 9 U.S.C § 2 (2000).  The section currently reads:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
176 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1).
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only require a small or nominal form of consideration and revision of the con-
tract to reflect the requisite level of clarity.  The benefit to the drafting party is
the assurance that the contract will be enforced; thus saving the drafting party
the expense of litigating the enforceability of the contract.
V. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Amendment provides each person with a fundamental right
to a jury trial that should be protected.  The FAA has reversed the judicial
hostility towards mandatory arbitration agreements and made it relatively easy
for employers and retailers to gain an employee’s or consumer’s consent to an
arbitration agreement without placing the employee or consumer on notice of
the agreement.  Courts have used various standards in determining the enforce-
ability of arbitration agreements but most, especially those utilizing the major-
ity contract law approach, do not protect the employee’s and consumer’s rights
and often enforce arbitration agreements that employees and consumers do not
know they signed.  In the context of early retirement packages, the higher stan-
dard of the OWBPA more adequately protects employees’ rights to pursue
claims against their employers, and therefore a similar standard should be used
in the mandatory arbitration agreement context.  A standard similar to the
OWBPA would more adequately protect employees’ and consumers’ right to a
jury trial and benefit employers and retailers by ensuring the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.  Therefore, Congress should amend the FAA to include
higher notice and consent standards in order to ensure that employees and con-
sumers are not subjected to arbitration agreements without sufficient notice.
